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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
RUTH CAFFALL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
VERN CAFF ALL, 
Defenda.nt and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8447 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. 
All italics are ours. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this case the plaintiff, Ruth Caffall, on the 6th day 
of September, 1945 filed a complaint in the Third Judicial 
Court praying for a decree of divorce from the defendant 
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Vern Caffall; and on the 22nd day of October, 1945 a decree 
of divorce was duly entered, and said decree provided that 
the care, custody and control of the two minor children of 
plaintiff and defendant be awarded to the plaintiff and 
that the defendant be ordered to pay the sum of $25.00 
per month alimony and the. sum of $25.00 each for the 
support of the two minor children of plaintiff and defen-
dant. 
That on the 22nd day of July, 1954 the defendant Vern 
Caffall filed in the Clerk's office of Salt Lake County a 
petition to set aside the decree of divorce theretofore en-
tered and in said petition alleged : That on the 22nd day 
of July, 1936 the plaintiff Ruth Dolar Caffall entered into 
a purported marriage ceremony with the defendant Vern 
Caffall at Pocatello, Idaho. That at the time the said plain-
tiff Ruth Dolar Caffall entered into said marriage ceremony 
with the defendant she "·as legally married and had no legal 
capacity to marry, yet entered into the said marriage cere-
mony with the defendant Vern Caffall, and that said pur-
ported marriage ceremony was from its inception null and 
void and of no legal force and effect, and that the decree 
of divorce entered in said action by the court on the 22nd 
day of October, 19~15 is therefore null and Yoid and without 
legal force and effect, and has been null and void from its 
inception, and the petition of said defendant prays that 
the purported divorce secured in the above entitled court 
on the 22nd da~~ of October, 1945 be set aside and declar~d 
n 11 II and void ( R. ~~ ) . 
That on the 27th day of January, 1955 the defendant 
\lern Caffall b~~ his attorney Raymond R. Brady served 
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l: upon the plaintiff certain interrogatories as provided by 
~~ rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to answer 
l under oath the following questions (R. 14) : 
t: "A. Did you marry C. B. Bradford at Evan-
ston, Wyoming on the 8th day of October, 1935? 
"B. Were you legally married to him on July 
20, 1936? 
"C. If you were not married to Mr. Bradford 
on July 20, 1936, when and where were you divorced 
from Mr. Bradford? 
"D. If you were not a divorced woman on July 
26, 1936, had you previously secured an annulment? 
If so, when and where? 
"E. Was Mr. Bradford living on July 20, 1936? 
If not, when and where did he die?" 
To the foregoing interrogatories, the plaintiff Ruth 
Caffall did on the 2nd day of February, 1955 file her 
answer under oath (R. 15) and in answer to interrogatory 
"A" Mrs. Caffall stated, "I married C. G. Bradford at Evan-
ston, Wyoming on the 8th day of October, 1935," and in 
answer to interrogatory "E" lVIrs. Caffall answered that to 
her best knowledge Mr. Bradford was living on the 20th 
day of July, 1936 and died sometime in 1939. 
That on the 8th day of February, 1955 at 10 :00 o'clock 
A. M. before the I-Ionorable Clarence E. Baker the defen-
dant's petition to vacate and set aside the decree was duly 
heard, and testimony introduced. That the plaintiff testi-
fied (R. 5) as follows: 
"Q. Let's take the next one, Interrogatory 'C' ·: 
If you were not married to Mr. Bradford on July 
20, 1936, when and where were you divorced from 
Mr. Bradford? 
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"A. I appeared in the District Court of Sal~ 
Lake County approximately the last week in October,. 
1935 with attorney Matthews for the purpose of; 
securing an annulment, which annulment I though~ 
had been obtained. 
"A. y es. 
"Q. Did Mr. Matthews bring you down to: 
court? 
"A. y es. 
"Q. Did you testify? 
"A. No, I didn't testify. 
"Q. Did you file any legal proceedings? 
"A. V{ell, it has been so long ago I rightl., 
can't remember. You "ill have to ask Mr. Matthews. 
1\Ir. Matthews \Yas duly called as a witness and testi-
fied ( R. 22) that he had never taken Mrs. Caffall to court 
and had never secured an annulment, and that he had 
checked the records and found that there had never been 
an annulment obtained. The court, at the conclusion of the 
hearing, took the matter under advisement, and on the 5th 
day of October, 1955 rendered his decision thereon, denying~ 
the defendant's petition to vacate and set aside the Jlecree 
of divorce, from \Yhich judgn1ent the defendant appeals. 
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
TliAT rrHE COURT CO~IMITTED ERROR IN 
DEN\ .. ING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION 
TO V'A.CATE .4-\ND SET ASIDE THE DECREE 
OF DI''\10RCE. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION 
TO VACATE AND SET ASIDE THE DECREE 
OF DIVORCE. 
The preponderance of the evidence establishes that at 
he time of the marriage of the plaintiff Ruth Caffall to 
he defendant Vern Caffall she was in fact married to C. 
i. Bradford and had no legal capacity to marry the defen-
~~Irf·:lant Vern Caffall. The plaintiff, in her answer to defen-
~~~H-ant's Interrogatory "A", admitted (R. 15) that she mar-
~ ,,,~ '', ' 
· ~ied C. G. Bradford at Evanston, Wyoming on the 8th day 
:~rr~of October, 1935. The plaintiff testified (R. 15) that she 
~::1ppeared in the District Court for Salt Lake County ap-
Knproximately the last week of October, 1935 with her attor-
ljpney, 0. H. Matthews, for the purpose of obtaining an annul-
ij[c~:ment (R. 21). The testimony of her attorney, 0. H. Mat-
,i,:thews, (R. 22) denies that he ever appeared in court with 
~Mrs. Caffall and that he ever filed an annulment for her, 
;:.:);and t~t he had searched the records of the Clerk's office 
r9f Salt Lake County and found that an annulment had never 
·been taken seems to clearly establish that Mrs. Caffall had 
1
nJ:never obtained a divorce or annulment prior to her mar-
riage to the defendant Vern Caffall. The plaintiff's answe·r 
_.to the defendant's Interrogatory "E" (R. 15) admitted that 
:, Mr. Bradford was alive at the time of her marriage to the 
~~defendant Vern Caffall, and seems to remove all doubt 
1,-
l~that Mrs. Caffall was in fact married to Mr. C. G. Bradford 
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at the time she married Mr. Caffall, and had no legal capac. 
ity to marry him. 
The law is well settled that if the court does not have 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, that any decree entered 
is a nullity and is void and should be vacated and set aside 
upon application. In 27 C. J. S., Sec. 169, P. 812, the law 
is set forth as follows : 
"A divorce decree granted by a court without 
jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the person 
is void and should be set aside irrespective of fraud." 
The evidence in this case before the court clearly shows 
that the parties were not legally married at the time the 
divorce proceedings of Ruth Dolar Caffall vs. Vern Caffall, 
defendant in this action, were commenced. The Utah 
divorce statute (U. C. A. 193, 30-3-1) provides as follows: 
"Proceedings in divorce should be commenced 
and conducted in the manner prescribed by law for 
proceedings in civil cases, except as hereinafter pro-
vided, and the court may decree a dissolution of the 
marriage contract between the plaintiff and defen-
dant in a case where the plaintiff shall have been an 
actual and bona fide resident in this state and the 
county where the action is entered for three, months 
next prior to the commencement of the action, for 
any of the following grounds; * * * ." 
It is obvious from a plain reading of the statute that the 
jurisdiction of the court in divorce matters is limited to the 
dissolution of marriages, and where the evidence shows 
that there is no valid marriage contract then existing, the 
court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter, and any 
decree by the court would be void, ab i nitio. 
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)\~~. Regardless of the extent of its equity powers in other 
matters, a court of equity cannot assume any powers in 
1~:~~ divorce actions or proceedings other than those which are 
~~: expressly conferred by statute (Towns vs. Towns, 176 N. 
~~it W. 216), and since the Utah divorce statute confers juris-
l~: diction only to dissolve marriages and conveys no further 
jurisdiction, this court has no jurisdiction unless there is 
in fact a valid existing marriage at the time the action is 
'")1. 
I,,~ commenced. In 27 C. J. S., P. 628 the rule is stated as fol-
t ·~ 
;~· lows: 
"The general power to grant a divorce is statu-
tory, and particular courts have such power and only 
such power in this regard as is conveyed by statutory 
or constitutional provisions. In view that a divorce 
proceeding, insofar as it affects the status of the 
parties, is an action in rem, it can be stated broadly 
that in order that any court may obtain jurisdiction 
of any action for divorce, such court must obtain 
jurisdiction of the· res, that is, of the marriage 
status." 
In the case of Anderson vs. Anderson, 44 N. E. 2nd 
54, P. 57, the court said: 
"The jurisdiction of a court hearing divorce 
matters depends upon the grant of the statute and 
not upon its general equity powers." 
In Smith vs. Smith, 166 N. E. 85, the court said: 
"Courts of equity have no inherent powers in 
cases of divorce. The jurisdiction of courts of equity 
to hear and determine divorce cases and all matters 
related thereto is conferred entirely by statute. 
vVhil~ s.uch courts may exercise their powers within 
the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by the stat-
ute, the jurisdiction depends upon the grant of the 
statute and not upon general equity powers." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
It seems to clearly follow that if there is in fact no 
marriage there would be no res or subject matter over 
which the court would have jurisdiction, and any action 
taken by the court would be without jurisdiction and void. 
In the case at bar the great preponderance of evidence 
shows that there was in fact no valid existing marriage 
between the parties at the time the action for divorce was 
commenced or at the time the divorce was entered, and for 
that reason, the court having no jurisdiction of the subject 
matter, the decree was void from the beginning. (C. J. S. 
27, P. 812.) 
"A divorce decree granted by a court without 
jurisdiction of the subject matter entered or of the 
person, is void and should be set aside irrespective 
of the question of fraud." 
The rule is well stated in Nelson on Divorce and Annul-
ment, Vol. 3, P. 175, Sec. 28.27: 
"If the court granting a purported divorce 
lacked jurisdiction to grant such relief, its decree is 
beyond the court and unquestionably open to attack 
by anyone at any time. But if it had jurisdiction of 
the subject matter the court's decree is not open to 
attack for error in its findings as to residence re-
quirement, and the party "\vho sought the divorce 
or the opposing party if he is guilty of collusion or 
acquiescence in the proceedings is estopped to ques-
tion such findings." 
In Ho1oard vs. Howard, 26 N. E. (2nd), 421, the court 
says: 
"A decree entered \Vithout jurisdiction is void 
and can be vacated at any time, and may be even 
attacked collaterally.'' 
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Miller vs. Prout, 197 Pac. 1033, is a case of a void 
judg1nent, the invalidity of which does not appear on the 
face of the record, and was vacated upon motion and a show-
ing by extrinsic evidence. The case of Choi ys. Turk, 152 
Pac. 1000, an Oklahoma case holding that a void judgment 
would be set aside and vacated at any time on a motion in 
a direct proceeding. The case of Behymer vs. Schrader, 19 
Pac. 2nd 829, is another case with the same holding, and 
in this case the court said: 
"It is conceded that the attack made on the 
judgment quieting title is collateral and not direct. 
The chief distinction between a collateral and a di-
rect attack upon such a judgment is that in a 
collateral attack the evidence shown may be raised 
to show excess of jurisdiction is restricted to the 
judgment role as defined by law at the time of the 
rendition of the judgment, but whereby a resort to 
such evidence the want of validity in the judgment 
is demonstrated, the duty to declare it void is im-
perative in collateral as well as direct attack." 
This case shows the distinction between a case in which 
a void judgment is attacked in a direct attack and not in a 
collateral attack. There are many cases holding that a 
judgment cannot be attacked collaterally, but there are few 
if any cases holding that a direct attack cannot be made by 
motion in the proceedings in a divorce action where the 
facts show that the decree is in fact void for lack of juris-
diction of the subject matter. 
In the case of Hutton vs. Dodge, 198 Pac. 162, our 
Supreme Court quoted with approval the following language 
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from the opinion of Chief Justice Shaw, 2 Gray 61, Ma. 
Dec. 454: 
"But we think the point here is settled by au-
thority, not specifically in regard to divorce but 
generally as to the conclusive fact of a judgment 
in a case arising afterwards in the same matter 
between the same parties. We take the rule to be 
that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction 
having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of 
the parties, the legal processes duly served, where 
no appeal, writ of error, or review or other legal 
process is commenced by the party who would void 
the judgment in the mode or time prescribed by law 
is conclusive upon the same parties in any other 
proceeding in law or equity or before any other 
judicial tribunal." 
Our Supreme Court, after approving the foregoing 
language, expressly limited this rule to those cases wherein 
the court has jurisdiction of both the person and the subject 
matter, and used the following language: 
"Thus we see the application of the doctrine 
contended for by the appellant is conditional upon 
the fact that express jurisdiction has been obtained 
both of the subject matter and of the person. 
"It is unnecessary to review the cases in detail. 
They are clearly distinguishable from the case at 
bar. They do not in any manner atte11~pt to contro-
ve~rt the fundamental idea that where jurisdiction 
has not been obtained there is no basis for the plea 
res adjudica.ta. As stated by Chief Justice Shaw in 
the excerpt hereinbefore quoted, a judgment becomes 
res adjudicata only when the court has acquired 
jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the par-
ties." 
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In the case of Lockw·ood vs. Lockwood, 168 P. 501, an 
Arizona case, the court held that where there is a failure 
to get jurisdiction of the defendant in a divorce action upon 
a proper showing the court should set aside the judgment at 
any time. And again, we say that the same rule would 
apply to those cases where the court had no jurisdiction of 
the subject matter. 
In the case of In re Christensen Estate, 53 P. 1003, our 
Supreme Court said : 
"A decree of divorce granted without jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter or of the person is abso-
lutely void." 
The same rule is expressed by the Supreme Court of 
Iowa in the case of Radle vs. Radle, 214 N. W. 603, where 
the court in a divorce action sustained a motion to set aside 
the decree on the grounds there had been no proper service 
of summons, and in setting aside the decree the court said: 
"It is of course true that if the decree com-
plained of is absolutely void for want of jurisdic-
tion of the court, then it would be subject to either 
a direct or collateral attack and by procedure quite 
independent of the statute. If therefore we should 
look upon defendant's motion either as a direct or 
collateral attack upon a void decree, he is under no 
less burden of proving facts which negative the 
jurisdiction of the court." 
In line with this case some jurisdictions have held that 
where a direct attack is made upon the validity of a void 
judgment the burden is upon the party raising the question 
to assume the burden of proof of showing that the judg-
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ment or decree is in fact void for lack of jurisdiction. We 
believe that the defendant, Vern Caffall, has sustained that 
burden of proof in this case now before the court. This 
Iowa case is in harmony with the decision of our own court 
and follows the rule that the judgment rendered is. abso-
lutely void if the court did not in fact have jurisdiction of 
the person and the subject matter, but creates a presump-
tion that the decree is valid and places the burden of proof 
upon the party asserting a lack of jurisdiction of proving 
lack of jurisdiction, but when the one raising the question 
of jurisdiction has assumed that burden of proof as Mr. 
Caffall has in this case, then the court should vacate and 
set aside the decree. 
In the case at bar the defendant, Vern Caffall, filed 
a petition in the original divorce proceeding to vacate and 
set aside the decree on the ground that the court had no 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, and on the hearing the 
evidence clearly established that at the time of the mar-
riage of the plaintiff to defendant, plaintiff was in fact 
married to another man, and was, of course, never legally 
married to defendant, and plaintiff and defendant not being 
legally married, this court has no jurisdiction over the 
subject matter, and the decree was absolutely void from 
the beginning and can be attacked in a direct attack at any 
time. 
It may be conceded that some of the texts and cases 
seem to hold that if the decree is valid on its face it can-
not be vacated. In other words, before the decree may be 
vacated the lack of jurisdiction must appear on the face 
of the judgment roll and cannot be shown by extrinsic evi-
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dence. But an examination of these cases reveals that they 
are cases wherein the attack on the judgment is a collateral 
attack and not a direct attack as we have in the case at bar. 
But, a direct attack on the judgment by a petition in the 
original divorce proceedings to vacate and set aside the 
judgment is a direct attack and the courts have generally 
held as did our Supreme Court in the case of Hutton vs. 
Dodge, that such a proceeding is a direct attack and that 
on the hearing of the motion to vacate and set aside the 
judgment any fact going to show the lack of jurisdiction of 
the court to enter the judgment may be presented, and if 
the facts show that the court had no jurisdiction of either 
the person or the subject matter, the court should declare 
the j udginent void. 
The language of the court of Idaho in the case of 
Bald~win vs. Anderson, 8 P. (2nd), 461, expresses the 
more reasonable rule to be followed in cases involving this 
problem: 
"The power within proper limits to vacate its 
judgments is inherent in all courts of record inde-
pendent of statute (Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed. 
Sec. 194, p. 375). While we have no statute ex-
pressly authorizing the vacation of a judgment on 
motion, the inherent power of courts of record to 
vacate their judgments void upon the face of the 
judgment roll upon the motion of a party or on its 
own motion at any time has been repeatedly recog-
nized, by this court, and where the invalidity of a 
void judgment does not appear on the face of the 
judgment roll, it may be vacated upon motion made 
within a reasonable time. Such motion is a direct 
and not a collateral attack on the judgment, and any 
facts going to show the invalidity of the judgment 
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can be presented at the hearing of the motion. In 
addition to jurisdiction of the parties and the sub-
ject matter, it is necessary to the validity of the 
judgment that the court have jurisdiction of the 
question which its judgment assumes to decide and 
jurisdiction to render the judgment for the particu-
lar remedy or relief which the judgment undertakes 
to grant.'' 
In the case at bar the court did not have jurisdiction 
of the subject matter. 
Even though this court should follow those few cases 
In which the courts have held that before the court can 
vacate and set aside the judgment the lack of jurisdiction 
must appear on the face of the judgment roll, this court 
could not do so in the case at bar. In the case of Thompson 
vs. Cook, 127 P. (2nd) 909, the Supreme Court held that 
the trial court has no power to set aside on motion a judg-
ment or order not void on its face unless the motion is made 
within a reasonable time from the date of the entry of the 
judgment except where the party in whose favor an order 
or judgment, valid on its face, runs, admits facts or fails 
to dispute evidence showing its invalidity, then the trial 
court must declare the judgment void. In the case at bar 
the court, having permitted the introduction of evidence as 
to the question of jurisdiction at the hearing upon defen-
dant's petition to vacate the decree and the evidence now 
before the court not being successfully disputed that there 
was no valid existing marriage between the parties and 
the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the 
action at the time the divorce was granted, this court must 
now vacate the decree as the California court did in the 
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case of Thompson vs. Cook. This rule is also well stated in 
the case of Huffman vs. Huffman, 86 P. 593, where the 
court said: 
"Where a void judgment is called to the atten-
tion of the court, it is incumbent upon that tribunal 
to purge its own records of the nullity by cancelling 
the entry thereof." 
The case of Rynearson vs. Union County, 102 P. 785, 
holds that if upon application, a void judgment is not set 
aside, and the invalidity is attempted to be upheld, whereby 
the court in refusing to discharge the duty thus devolving 
upon it, exercises its judicial functions erroneously. 
It seems to the writer that the clear duty of this court 
is to set aside the decree of divorce in this case because the 
evidence now before this court established the fact that the 
plaintiff and defendant were not in fact married at the 
time the divorce proceedings were had, and this court had 
no jurisdiction of the subject matter and the decree is void, 
and that this precise question was determined by our own 
Supreme Court in the case of Hutton vs. Dodge. 
This court should set aside a void judgment at any time 
it is called to the attention of the court as was stated in the 
case of JtVhite vs. Ladd, 680 P., 739, wherein the court said: 
"This power is inherent with the court and will 
be exercised even at its own suggestion for the pres-
ervation of its dignity and the protection of its offi-
cers and to arrest further actions which can serve 
no lawful purpose." 
SUMMARY 
At the time the plaintiff Ruth Caffall married the de-
fendant Vern Caffall she was then married to C. G. Brad-
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ford and had no legal capacity to marry the defendant Vern 
Caffall. That the Utah divorce statute confers jurisdiction 
only to dissolve marriages, and since there was no valid 
marriage existing between the parties at the time the 
divorce proceedings were had the court had no jurisdiction 
of the subject matter. 
CONCLUSIONS 
That since there was no valid existing marriage be-
tween the parties at the time the plaintiff filed her action 
for divorce, the court had no jurisdiction of the subject 
matter and the decree is void ab i nitio; and the trial judge 
committed error when it denied the defendant's petition to 
vacate and set aside the divorce decree. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND R. BRADY, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
616 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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